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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
OAKES, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case, the United States appeals the decision of the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey (John C. 
Lifland, Judge) that the defendants are jointly and severally 
liable, rather than individually liable, for statutory damages 
of $5,000 "per violation" of the Freedom of Access to Clinic 
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Entrances Act ("FACE" or "the Act"), 8 U.S.C. S 248 (2000). 
Several defendants filed cross appeals, arguing that FACE 
is a violation of Congress's authority under the U.S. 
Constitution's Commerce Clause and of the First 
Amendment. We conclude that damages under FACE are 
properly awarded jointly and severally among defendants 
and that FACE is constitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the 
district court. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
On April 18, 1997, the United States, through the United 
States Attorney General, filed a complaint for injunctive 
relief and statutory damages against thirty defendants1 
who, the Attorney General alleged, were an ongoing threat 
to the Metropolitan Medical Associates ("MMA"), a 
reproductive health clinic in Englewood, New Jersey, its 
employees and persons seeking reproductive health services 
at MMA. Specifically, the Attorney General alleged that each 
defendant participated in one, two, or three protests that 
obstructed access to MMA in violation of FACE. In the 
prayer for relief in the Complaint, the Attorney General 
elected to pursue statutory damages of $5,000 per 
defendant in lieu of proving actual damages to MMA. 
 
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on July 8- 
10, 1997, on the Attorney General's motion for a 
preliminary injunction. The evidence at the hearing 
demonstrated that five of the named defendants blocked 
access to MMA on August 7, 1996, twelve of the named 
defendants blocked access to MMA on January 18, 1997, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The defendants named in the complaint are Joseph R. Gregg, Ruby C. 
McDaniel, Luis Menchaca, Francis S. Pagnanelli, William Charles Raiser, 
Michael Henry, Rose Kidd, Arnold Matheson, Katharine O'Keefe, Eva 
Alvarado, Joseph Roach, Robert Rudnick, James Soderna, James 
Sweatt, Elizabeth Wagi, Byron Adams, Kevin Blake, Amy Boissonneault, 
Baldo Dino, Stephen C. Elliot, Sheryl Fitzpatrick, Mary Foley, Dennis 
Green, George Lynch, Raymond Micco, Alexis Mulrenan, Ralph 
Traphagen, James Trott, and Kimiko Trott. The Attorney General 
dismissed the charges against Mary Foley and her name has been 
removed from the caption. They will be referred to in this opinion 
collectively as "the defendants" unless it is necessary to provide names. 
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and nineteen of the named defendants blocked access to 
MMA on March 15, 1997. Accordingly, on December 22, 
1997, the district court enjoined defendants and their 
employees, agents, and others acting in concert with them, 
from blocking and impeding access to MMA, intimidating or 
attempting to intimidate or interfere with persons seeking 
access to MMA, and entering or being on MMA premises. 
 
After the preliminary injunction was granted, the parties 
informed the district court that they disagreed over the 
proper interpretation of the civil remedies available under 
FACE. At the district court's request, the parties submitted 
briefs addressed to the proper interpretation of statutory 
damages under FACE. On June 18, 1998, after considering 
the parties' pleadings, the district court issued a 
memorandum wherein, rejecting the Attorney General's 
argument that statutory damages should be assessed on 
each defendant per violation, it concluded that the $5,000 
statutory damages were to be assessed per violation and 
that all defendants who participated in each violation would 
be held jointly and severally liable for $5,000. 
 
On December 11, 1998, the district court granted the 
Attorney General's motion for summary judgment and 
issued a Memorandum and Order Entering Final 
Judgment. See United States v. Gregg, 32 F. Supp. 2d 151 
(D.N.J. 1998). The district court found that the defendants 
violated FACE when they conducted the three blockades. 
See id. at 153-58. The district court determined that 
Congress intended statutory damages of $5,000 to be 
assessed per violation and against all responsible persons 
severally. See id. at 160-61. Accordingly, the defendants 
were held jointly and severally liable for $5,000 in statutory 
damages for each violation in which they participated. See 
id. at 161 (holding five defendants jointly and severally 
liable for the August 7 blockade, twelve defendants jointly 
and severally liable for the January 18 blockade, and 
eighteen defendants jointly and severally liable for the 
March 15 blockade). 
 
The Attorney General timely appealed the district court's 
decision and eight of the defendants2 cross appealed. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Rose Kidd, James Sweatt, Elizabeth Wagi, Raymond Micco, William 
Raiser, James Soderna, and Keven Blake filed a cross appeal on 
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Attorney General appeals that portion of the district court's 
decision that imposed the statutory damages jointly and 
severally. Defendants do not dispute the district court's 
findings that they violated FACE. Rather, Defendants 
contend that the Attorney General does not, under FACE, 
have the authority to elect statutory damages in lieu of 
proof of actual damages. In addition, they argue that FACE 
is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce 
power and that it violates defendants' rights guaranteed 
under the First Amendment of the Constitution. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We review the district court's award of summary 
judgment de novo. See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 
435, 439 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
I. 
 
The task of resolving how statutory penalties are to be 
awarded under FACE is a question of statutory 
interpretation which begins by discerning the plain 
meaning of FACE's statutory penalty provision. If 
Congress's intent as to this issue is plain, referral to other 
canons of statutory construction is unnecessary. See 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Nernberg, 3 F.3d 62, 64 (3d Cir. 
1993); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ("If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter[.]"). 
 
To determine a law's plain meaning, we begin with the 
language of the statute. See United States v. Ron Pair 
Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); New Rock Asset 
Partners v. Preferred Entity Advancements, 101 F.3d 1492, 
1498 (3d Cir. 1996); Santa Fe Medical Services, Inc. v. Segal 
(In Re Segal), 57 F.3d 342, 345 (3d Cir. 1995). If the 
language of the statute expresses Congress's intent with 
sufficient precision, the inquiry ends there and the statute 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
February 18, 1999. Francis S. Pagnanelli filed a separate cross appeal on 
February 18, 1999. Their arguments were consolidated in one appellate 
brief. 
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is enforced according to its terms. See Ron Pair Enterprises, 
Inc., 489 U.S. at 241. Where the statutory language does 
not express Congress's intent unequivocally, a court 
traditionally refers to the legislative history and the 
atmosphere in which the statute was enacted in an attempt 
to determine the congressional purpose. See New Rock, 101 
F.3d at 1498. Once the plain meaning of the statute is 
determined, it is conclusive "except in rare cases in which 
the literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters." Id. 
(quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. , 458 U.S. 564, 
571 (1982)). 
 
Section 248(a) of FACE, in relevant part, provides: 
 
       (a) Prohibited Activities. -- Whoever -- 
 
       (1) by force or threat of force or by physical 
       obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates, or 
       interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate, or 
       interfere with any person because that person is or has 
       been, or in order to intimidate such person or any 
       other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or 
       providing reproductive health services 
 
       . . . 
 
       shall be subject to the . . . civil remedies provided in 
       subsection (c) 
 
18 U.S.C. S 248(a)(2000). FACE further prohibits the 
intentional damage or destruction of a facility because it 
provides reproductive health services. See id . Any person 
aggrieved by the foregoing actions may bring a civil action 
for relief. See 18 U.S.C. S 248(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 
In any action under FACE, a person aggrieved by conduct 
prohibited under the Act, may obtain "temporary, 
preliminary or permanent injunctive relief and 
compensatory and punitive damages." 18 U.S.C. 
S 248(c)(1)(B) (2000). In addition, FACE allows a plaintiff in 
a civil action to elect, "in lieu of actual damages, an award 
of statutory damages in the amount of $5,000 per 
violation." 18 U.S.C. S 248(c)(1)(B) (2000). The Act permits 
the U.S. Attorney General and state attorneys general to 
bring civil actions for the same relief if they believe that a 
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person or group of persons has been aggrieved by violations 
of the Act. See 18 U.S.C. SS 248(c)(2), (3) (2000); H.R. Rep. 
No. 103-306, at 13 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
699, 710. In civil actions brought by an attorney general, 
 
       The court, to vindicate the public interest, may also 
       assess a civil penalty against each respondent -- 
 
       (i) in an amount not exceeding $10,000 for a nonviolent 
       physical obstruction and $15,000 for other first 
       violations; and 
 
       (ii) in an amount not exceeding $15,000 for a 
       nonviolent physical obstruction and $25,000 for any 
       other subsequent violation. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 248(c)(2)(B) (2000). 
 
The Attorney General argues that the district court 
incorrectly awarded statutory damages per violation 
presumably to be shared by the defendants involved with 
each blockade and contends that FACE and its goals 
require statutory damages to be awarded $5,000 per 
defendant. We agree with the district court that the 
"dichotomy of expression" between the civil remedy 
provisions of FACE demonstrates Congress's intent that 
statutory damages be imposed per violation and jointly and 
severally among the defendants who participated in the 
blockade. Gregg, 32 F. Supp.2d at 160; see also Milwaukee 
Women's Medical Services, Inc. v. Brock, 2 F. Supp. 2d 
1172, 1178 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (awarding statutory damages 
per violation rather than per defendant); Greenhut v. Hand, 
996 F. Supp. 372, 379 (D.N.J. 1998) (same); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Walton, 
1998 WL 88373 at *1-2 (E. D. Penn. Feb. 12, 1998) (same). 
 
In authorizing compensatory statutory damages of 
$5,000 in lieu of actual damages, Congress uses the phrase 
"per violation." 18 U.S.C. S 248(c)(1)(B). This is in sharp 
contrast to the language used in the provision permitting 
courts to assess substantial civil penalties to vindicate the 
public interest in cases brought by attorneys general. See 
18 U.S.C. S 248(c)(2)(B). In S 248(c)(2)(B), an attorney 
general can request civil penalties of up to $25,000"against 
each respondent." Id. The language ofS 248(c)(2)(B) 
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illustrates that Congress knew how to explicitly instruct a 
court to assess damages per defendant rather than per 
violation. The absence of analogous "per respondent" 
language in S 248(c)(1)(B) and the use instead of the phrase 
"per violation" indicates that Congress carefully considered 
the issue and decided that compensatory statutory 
damages will be imposed per violation, a manner that 
differs from the civil penalties imposed to vindicate the 
public interest. 
 
We disagree with the Attorney General that the use of 
"whoever" in S 248(a) means that compensatory statutory 
penalties are to be imposed individually. Section 248(a) 
defines the substantive liability under FACE. It does not 
address how, under the Act, civil compensatory damages 
are to be awarded. The use of the singular in that provision 
thus does not overcome the specific "per violation" language 
in the relevant remedy provision of the Act. Thus, the 
statutory language indicates that Congress intended that 
compensatory statutory damages, like those imposed in this 
case, are awarded per violation, presumably to be shared 
jointly and severally among the defendants who 
participated in the violation. 
 
This interpretation is consistent with FACE's legislative 
history and the atmosphere of anti-abortion violence in 
which FACE was enacted. FACE was enacted in 1994 
against a backdrop of escalating violence directed toward 
reproductive health clinics, their employees, and patients. 
Both the House and Senate Reports set forth detailed 
accounts of the virulent national campaign waged by anti- 
abortion activists. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, U.S.C.C.A.N., 
at 699. The evidence before Congress demonstrated that 
"this campaign of violence has lead to death, injury, 
harassment, fear, and thousands of arrests all across the 
nation." H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 6, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 703. 
Congress also set forth findings that state and local 
authorities had proved inadequate, and sometimes 
unwilling, to curb the violence. See S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 
17-18 (1993); H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 6, 10, 
U.S.C.C.A.N., at 703, 707 ("state and local enforcement 
authorities have failed to address effectively the systematic 
and nationwide assault that is being waged against health 
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care providers and patients."). Consequently, Congress 
enacted FACE with substantial federal remedies to prevent 
the "use of blockades, violence and other forceful or 
threatening tactics against medical facilities and health 
care personnel who provide abortion-related services. . . ." 
S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 2. In sum, FACE serves two 
important goals: First, federal remedies help compensate 
individuals and health care facilities for the harm caused 
by blockades and, second, they serve to deter protesters 
from repeatedly violating the law. 
 
The Attorney General argues that Congress intended 
statutory damages to be assessed per individual so that 
punishment would be imposed with the result of deterring 
defendants from violating FACE in the future. We agree 
with the Attorney General that deterrence is a primary goal 
of substantial federal penalties against clinic blockaders. 
This goal is well served by the availability of criminal 
sanctions, punitive damages, and civil penalties. See 18 
U.S.C. SS 248(b), (c). Congress explained, however, that the 
statutory penalties described in S 248(c)(1)(B) are available 
"in lieu of actual damages." According to the Senate Report, 
they were included to ease the often difficult task of proving 
actual loss in a case where anti-abortionists' tactics close a 
clinic temporarily or interfere with a person's access to 
reproductive health services. The senate report stated that 
statutory damages were included "[b]ecause of the expense 
and other difficulties of proving actual damages (for 
example, a clinic's lost income)." S. Rep. No. 103-117 at 26. 
Accordingly, the statutory penalties elected by the Attorney 
General in this case were included with the goal of 
compensating the victims of the misconduct prohibited by 
FACE. As the district court noted "[o]ne person can just as 
effectively injure, interfere with, or intimidate as can a 
group, depending on the circumstances." Gregg , 32 F. 
Supp.2d at 160. Damages to compensate thus have no 
bearing on how many individuals caused the damage. 
Because the legislative history of FACE indicates that the 
purpose of the statutory damages is to compensate, it 
follows that Congress intended that compensatory statutory 
damages be awarded per violation regardless of how many 
people participated in the misconduct. 
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Finally, the Attorney General argues that joint and 
several liability among defendants encourages individuals 
to engage in large, rather than small, blockades. With joint 
and several liability, the Attorney General contends, the 
total damages award "per violation" remains the same, yet 
the more persons who violate the law, the smaller the 
amount each defendant must pay, thus perversely tending 
to encourage, rather than discourage, defendants to 
organize blockades using greater, rather than smaller, 
groups of people. 
 
We are not convinced that awarding compensatory 
statutory penalties per violation rather than per defendant 
will cause defendants strategically to recruit more 
defendants for each violation. Because of the wide variety of 
remedies available under FACE, clinic blockaders will not 
know the penalties that they face for their misconduct and 
be able to plan accordingly. They will not know before the 
suit is filed whether an Attorney General or private plaintiff 
will opt for statutory damages in lieu of actual damages. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 248(c)(1)(B). They will also not know if they 
will be made subjects of a criminal prosecution and face 
criminal fines. See 18 U.S.C. S 248(b). Furthermore, in the 
case where an attorney general brings a civil action, he or 
she has the option of requesting that the court assess a 
civil penalty against each defendant in an amount as great 
as $25,000 in an appropriate case. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 248(c)(2)(B). Moreover, joint and several liability does not 
solely contemplate a group of liable defendants sharing the 
award among them. A liability is joint and several when 
"the creditor may sue one or more of the parties to such 
liability separately, or all of them together, at his [or her] 
option." Black's Law Dictionary 751 (5th ed. 1979). It is 
thus highly unlikely that a defendant or group of 
defendants would plan a clinic blockade or other violation 
of the Act in light of the penalty provisions under the Act. 
Because of the varying ways penalties under the Act may 
be assessed against a group of defendants involved in one 
violation, we are not convinced that the deterrent value of 
FACE is compromised by awarding the compensatory 
statutory damages jointly and severally as the Act plainly 
provides that they should be. 
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In sum, we conclude that Congress intended FACE's 
compensatory statutory damages be awarded per violation 
and jointly and severally among defendants. We base our 
conclusion primarily on Congress's use of "per violation" 
language in S 248(c)(1)(B) as opposed to the"per 
respondent" phrase in S 248(c)(2)(B). Furthermore, because 
Congress made statutory penalties available principally to 
ease the plaintiff 's burden of proving actual damages and 
other penalties to deter the misconduct prohibited by FACE 
are available, the $5,000 statutory damages are awarded 
per violation and jointly and severally among the 
participating defendants. 
 
II. 
 
Defendants argue that the Attorney General may not 
elect statutory damages in lieu of actual damages. Their 
argument misapprehends the statute and is belied by the 
Act's legislative history. Under FACE, the Attorney General 
of the United States and a state attorney general may 
commence a civil action against an individual or individuals 
who engage in the conduct prohibited by the Act. See 18 
U.S.C. S 248(c)(2). The Act provides that in an action 
initiated by an attorney general, "the court may award 
appropriate relief, including temporary, preliminary or 
permanent injunctive relief, and compensatory damages to 
persons aggrieved as described in paragraph (1)(B)." 8 
U.S.C. S 248(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Defendants contend 
that the phrase "compensatory damages" as used in 
S 248(c)(2)(B) refers only to actual damages and not to 
statutory damages. However, S 248(c)(1)(B) defines 
compensatory damages as actual and statutory damages. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 248(c)(1)(B). Thus, by using the term 
"compensatory damages" in S 248(c)(2)(B), Congress plainly 
meant to incorporate all of the text relevant to 
compensatory damages as set out in S 248(c)(1)(B). 
Therefore, the phrase "compensatory damages" as used in 
S 248(c)(B) authorizes the attorney general to elect an award 
of statutory damages. 
 
Furthermore, the legislative history demonstrates that 
Congress intended that statutory damages be awarded in a 
civil action initiated by an attorney general. The House 
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confirmed that "[t]he Act authorizes the U.S. Attorney 
General and State Attorneys General to bring civil causes of 
action on behalf of aggrieved persons for the same relief 
available in private actions; however, fees for attorney and 
expert witnesses may not be awarded to the United States." 
H.R. Rep. No. 103-106, at 3, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 700 
(emphasis added). Because the relief available in private 
actions includes statutory damages and Congress intended 
that an attorney general be entitled to the same relief as a 
private party, we reject the defendants' position that the 
Attorney General may not elect statutory damages in this 
case. 
 
III. 
 
A. Commerce Clause. 
 
We now turn to the question whether FACE falls within 
Congress's power under Article I, S 8 of the United States 
Constitution. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to 
"regulate Commerce . . . among the several states." U.S. 
Const., Art. I, S 8, cl. 3. Whether FACE is a proper exercise 
of Congress's commerce power has been much discussed in 
published opinions of United States Courts of Appeals. 
Indeed, this is one of the last federal appellate tribunals to 
address the issue. After considering most, if not all, of the 
arguments presented by the defendants in this case, these 
courts held that FACE is valid under the Commerce Clause. 
See United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir. 
2000); United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1071 (1999); Hoffman v. Hunt, 
126 F.3d 575, 582-88 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 
U.S. 1136 (1998); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 672- 
82 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1006 (1998); Terry 
v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 520 U.S. 1264 (1997); United States v. Soderna, 82 
F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006 
(1996); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919-21 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043 (1996); United States 
v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 679-88 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 806 (1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1519- 
22 (11th Cir. 1995). Today, this Circuit aligns with the 
decisions of its sister courts of appeals and holds that 
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FACE is a proper exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause 
power. 
 
In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995), 
a decision aptly described by this Court as changing the 
Commerce Clause landscape, see United States v. Parker, 
108 F.3d 28, 29 (3d Cir. 1997), the Supreme Court 
identified three broad categories of activity that Congress 
may regulate under its commerce power. Congress may: 1) 
"regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce," 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citations omitted); 2)"regulate and 
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons or things in interstate commerce even though the 
threat may come only from intrastate activity," Id. (citations 
omitted); and 3) "regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce . . . i.e., those 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. 
at 558-559 (citations omitted). 
 
Although the judicial branch is the final arbiter of the 
constitutionality of a statute, courts review a congressional 
determination that it had the power to enact a particular 
piece of legislation with substantial deference. See Parker, 
108 F.3d at 30; United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 576- 
77 (3d Cir. 1995). It is not our job to "second-guess the 
legislative judgment of Congress" that blockades and 
violence directed at reproductive health clinics can be 
regulated under the Commerce Clause power but, rather, to 
ensure that Congress had a rational basis for that 
conclusion. Parker, 108 F.3d at 30 (quoting Bishop, 6 F.3d 
at 577). We hold that under Lopez and this Circuit's 
precedent, FACE is a proper exercise of Congress's power to 
regulate intrastate conduct that, in the aggregate, has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.3 
 
In United States v. Morrison, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 
1740, 1749-52 (2000), the Supreme Court's most recent 
communique on Lopez's third category of regulation, the 
Court provided a framework to determine whether a law 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because we determine that FACE is a proper regulation of intrastate 
activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, we do not 
reach the Attorney General's argument that FACE is also a proper 
regulation of instrumentalities in commerce. 
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regulates an activity that has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. The Court identified four relevant 
considerations. These are: 1) the economic nature of the 
regulated activity, see id. at 1750; 2) a jurisdictional 
element limiting the reach of the law to a discrete set of 
activities that additionally has an explicit connection with 
or effect on interstate commerce, see id. at 1750-51; 3) 
express congressional findings regarding the effects upon 
interstate commerce of the activity in question, see id. at 
1751; and 4) the link between the regulated activity and 
interstate commerce, see id. at 1751. 
 
Morrison first asks a court to consider whether the 
federal law regulates intrastate economic or commercial 
activity. See id. at 1750. In Morrison , the Supreme Court 
noted, "In every case where we have sustained federal 
regulation under Wickard's aggregation principle, the 
regulated activity was of an apparent commercial 
character." Id. Accordingly, in Morrison, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the civil remedy provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act ("VAWA"), in part, because gender- 
motivated crimes "are not in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity." Id. at 1751. In contrast to gender- 
motivated crime, the activity regulated by FACE-- the 
physical obstruction and destruction of reproductive health 
clinics and the intentional interference and intimidation of 
persons obtaining and providing reproductive health 
services -- is activity with an effect that is economic in 
nature. Reproductive health clinics are income-generating 
businesses that employ physicians and other staff to 
provide services and goods to their patients. Motivated by 
anti-abortion sentiment, the primary goal of individuals and 
groups engaged in the misconduct prohibited by FACE is to 
temporarily and permanently interrupt the operations of 
reproductive health facilities and prevent individuals from 
accessing their services. See S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 11; 
H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 9, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 706. 
Congress found that the violent and obstructive acts 
directed at reproductive health facilities had caused 
millions of dollars of damage and forced clinics to close, 
caused serious and harmful delays in the provision of 
medical services and intimidated a number of physicians 
from offering abortion services. See S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 
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14; H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 7, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 704. The 
effect of the conduct proscribed by FACE is to deter, and in 
some cases to stop completely, the commercial activity of 
providing reproductive health services. We thus hold that 
although the connection to economic or commercial activity 
plays a central role in whether a law is valid under the 
Commerce Clause, we hold that economic activity can be 
understood in broad terms. Pursuant to this principle, 
unlike the activity prohibited by VAWA, the misconduct 
regulated by FACE, although not motivated by commercial 
concerns, has an effect which is, at its essence, economic. 
See Weslin, 156 F.3d at 296 (threats of violence that have 
the effect of deterring commercial activity is properly 
regulated under commerce clause); Hoffman, 126 F.3d at 
587 (activity regulated by FACE, while not itself economic 
or commercial, "is closely and directly connected with an 
economic activity . . . therefore . . . we cannot conclude that 
FACE has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of 
economic enterprise"); Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921 ("FACE 
prohibits interference with a commercial activity-- the 
provision and receipt of reproductive health services."); 
Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 ("the Access Act does regulate 
commercial activity, the provision of reproductive health 
services."). 
 
Morrison next instructs a court to consider the existence 
of a jurisdictional element. 120 S. Ct. at 1750-51."A 
jurisdictional element . . . refers to a provision in a federal 
statute that requires the government to establish specific 
facts justifying the exercise of federal jurisdiction in 
connection with any individual application of the statute." 
United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 2008 (2000). FACE 
does not contain an explicit jurisdictional element 
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance 
of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 
Although such an element would certainly lend support to 
the conclusion that FACE is tied to interstate commerce, we 
conclude that it was not necessary for Congress explicitly to 
limit the civil remedy provision in the case of regulating 
anti-abortion activity directed at reproductive health clinics 
that are, by definition, directly engaged in the business of 
providing reproductive health services. See Bird , 124 F.3d 
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at 675 (reasoning that a jurisdictional element is"not 
always a necessary" method to ensure that Congress does 
not exceed its commerce power). 
 
Morrison also directs that the existence of congressional 
findings on the burden of the regulated activity on 
interstate commerce "may enable [a court] to evaluate the 
legislative judgment that the activity in question 
substantially affects interstate commerce." Morrison, 120 S. 
Ct. at 1752 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563). Congress's 
conclusion that the activity proscribed by FACE burdens 
interstate commerce is a conclusion derived from months of 
legislative hearings, research, and debate. The Senate 
Judiciary Committee and the House Committee on Labor 
and Human Resources which considered the legislation 
before it became law submitted extensive reports on the 
necessity of FACE. See Bird, 124 F.3d at 678. Thus, 
Congress's conclusion that FACE is constitutional is 
entitled to judicial deference. See Parker, 108 F.3d at 29. 
 
Finally, in accordance with the fourth factor of Morrison, 
the findings set forth in the House and Senate Committee 
Reports demonstrate that Congress had a rational basis 
upon which to conclude that the activities governed by 
FACE have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As 
set out in detail below, the findings show that a national 
market for abortion-related services exists in this country 
and that reproductive health clinics are directly engaged in 
interstate commerce. The findings further demonstrate that 
a national movement engaged in the activities proscribed by 
FACE has decreased the availability of abortion-related 
services in the national market and caused women seeking 
services and physicians providing services to travel 
interstate. Accordingly, the activity proscribed by FACE has 
a substantial effect on the interstate commerce of 
reproductive health services. 
 
The legislative record establishes that a shortage of 
abortion-related services exists in this country that is 
exacerbated by the misconduct proscribed by FACE. See S. 
Rep. No. 103-117, at 17. Only 17 percent of counties in the 
United States have an abortion provider. See H.R. Rep. No. 
103-306, at 8, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 705. This leaves 83 percent 
of counties without a physician willing to perform 
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abortions. See S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 17 & n.29. The 
shortage is most severe in rural counties because 
reproductive health clinics are located primarily in 
metropolitan areas, leaving women residing in rural areas 
without a provider of these services. See H.R. Rep. No. 103- 
306, at 8, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 705. In a rural community, only 
one provider usually exists in a large geographical area, 
thus making it a preferred target for anti-abortionists 
because elimination of that provider eliminates abortion 
services for all women in that area. See H.R. Rep. No. 103- 
306, at 8, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 705. 
 
The shortage of abortion-related services has resulted in 
a national market for these services because many of the 
patients must engage in interstate commerce by traveling 
from one state to obtain reproductive health services in 
another. Testimony and evidence before Congress showed 
that substantial numbers of women travel interstate to seek 
the services of reproductive health clinics. See  S. Rep. No. 
103-117, at 31; H.R. Rep. No. 103-603, at 6, U.S.C.C.A.N., 
at 703. Many patients travel over 100 miles to their 
appointments. See S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 17 & n.29. For 
one example, Ms. Sylvia Doe, who testified before Congress 
that after learning her baby suffered from a permanent 
disability that would cause its early death, traveled from 
Virginia to a clinic in Kansas capable of performing the 
procedure she required. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 7-8, 
U.S.C.C.A.N, at 704-5. Furthermore, the Senate found that 
44 percent of the patients treated at a clinic in Wichita, KS, 
are from out of state. See S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 31. 
Congress's determination that reproductive health services 
are an interstate market was well supported by the 
testimony presented to the committees. See Bird , 124 F.3d 
at 668-79 (setting forth a summary of testimony). 
 
In addition, reproductive health clinics employ a national 
market of physicians and staff. Because of the shortage of 
physicians willing to perform abortions in the age of clinic 
violence, doctors employed at reproductive health clinics 
often travel across state lines to provide abortion services. 
See S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 31 & n.46. "Some doctors 
traveled to several states, some for hundreds of miles, to 
perform abortions at clinics which had no physicians of 
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their own." Id. For example, in South Dakota the only 
physician who performs abortions commutes from 
Minnesota and provides abortion services in Minnesota, 
Montana, North Dakota, and parts of Canada. See id. at 
16-17 & n. 29, 31. 
 
The Senate Committee also concluded that reproductive 
health clinics engage in interstate commerce. The 
Committee reported that 
 
       Clinics and other abortion service providers clearly are 
       involved in interstate commerce, both directly and 
       indirectly. They purchase medicine, medical supplies, 
       surgical instruments and other necessary medical 
       products, often from other States; they employ staff; 
       they own and lease office space; they generate income. 
       In short, the Committee finds that they operate within 
       the stream of interstate commerce. 
 
S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 31. Thus, Congress found that a 
national market existed for reproductive health services 
because of the shortage of physicians who provide abortion- 
related services, that reproductive health clinics often 
employ physicians from outside the state in which they are 
located, and reproductive health clinics themselves are 
engaged in interstate commerce. 
 
Finally, Congress determined that the conduct prohibited 
by FACE inhibits and prohibits the delivery of reproductive 
health care services in the national market. Based on the 
testimony and evidence before it, Congress found that the 
clinic blockades, the threats against employees, and the 
other violent and obstructive activities prohibited by FACE 
have the single goal of eliminating the practice of abortion 
by closing abortion clinics. See S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 11; 
H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 6, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 703. 
Congress also, based on the evidence before it, rationally 
determined that the national movement was succeeding. 
The House Report stated that the "campaign of violence has 
led to death, injury, harassment, fear, and thousands of 
arrests all across the nation. It has resulted, as intended, 
in access to the constitutionally protected right to choose 
being denied to thousands of women nationwide against 
their will." H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 6, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 
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703. The Senate Report states that clinic blockades and 
violent protests proscribed by the Act have "a significant 
adverse impact not only on abortion patients and providers, 
but also on the delivery of a wide range of health care 
services." S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 14. The effect of the 
violence forced "clinics to close, caused serious and harmful 
delays in the provision of medical services, and increased 
health risks to patients." Id. 
 
Furthermore, when FACE was enacted, millions of dollars 
of damage had been caused to these facilities by the clinic 
blockades. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 7, U.S.C.C.A.N., 
at 704. The damage caused to reproductive health care 
facilities eliminates on a temporary or permanent basis the 
reproductive health care services that are provided by the 
facilities. See id. at 9, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 706. Thus, the 
activities proscribed by FACE inhibit the operation of 
entities that are directly engaged in interstate commerce. 
 
Congress explicitly noted the link between the abortion- 
related violence and the shortage of physicians willing to 
perform abortions. A number of physicians and health care 
personnel have been intimidated by the threats of violence 
made to them and their families and have stopped 
providing their services, thus contributing to the shortage 
of providers. The House Committee found that rural clinics 
and doctors have become the preferred targets for abortion 
foes because elimination of that single provider effectively 
eliminates service for many women. See id. at 8, 
U.S.C.C.A.N., at 705. The Senate Committee also reported 
that the violence "has . . . taken a severe toll on providers, 
intimidated some into ceasing to offer abortion services, 
and contributed to an already acute shortage of qualified 
abortion providers." S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 14. 
Specifically, "some providers have succumbed to the 
intimidation and threats." Id. at 17. At least three 
physicians in Dallas stopped performing abortions in 1992 
as a result of pressure by an anti-abortion group, two 
doctors stopped working in 1993 after receiving death 
threats, and since Dr. Gunn, an abortion-provider in 
Florida, was shot in 1993, at least eight more doctors have 
stopped offering abortion services. See id. at 16-17. The 
House Committee also reported that the shortage of 
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abortion providers is "at least partially attributable to the 
violence and intimidation described in this report. Doctors 
understandably are leaving the field, and new graduate[s] 
have little desire to enter the field even as part of a wider 
obstetrics/gynecology practice." H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 
8, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 705. 
 
Moreover, although under Lopez Congress may regulate 
intrastate activity that in the aggregate has an effect on 
interstate commerce, the anti-abortion movement itself 
whose conduct is regulated by FACE is national in scope. 
Congress found that many of the activities were organized 
and directed across state lines. See S. Rep. No. 103-117, at 
13, 14 & n.26; H.R. Rep. No. 103-306, at 9, U.S.C.C.A.N., 
at 706. The House reported that a national strategy has 
emerged, orchestrated by anti-abortion leaders. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 103-306, at 9, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 706. Congress 
found that the conduct regulated by FACE was beyond the 
control of local and state authorities. Thus, when it enacted 
FACE, Congress sought to regulate a truly national 
problem. 
 
In sum, due to the acute shortage of abortion-related 
services in this country and the resulting national market 
for abortion-related services, the conduct proscribed by 
FACE -- the commission of blockades and other acts of 
violence -- has a substantial effect on the availability in 
interstate commerce of reproductive health services. The 
effect of the misconduct is to deter physicians from 
providing further services and temporarily and permanently 
to shut down reproductive health clinics, thus forcing large 
numbers of women to travel across state lines to obtain 
services. We, thus, must agree with the testimony before 
the Senate that, 
 
       the shift of demand for abortion services from those 
       areas where clinic access is obstructed to those areas 
       where it is not represents the sort of interstate 
       commerce effect that is beyond the effective control of 
       any one state and is accordingly a proper subject for 
       congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. 
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Bird, 124 F.3d at 681 (quoting Senate Hearings, at 97 
(statement of Professor Tribe)).4 
 
Our determination that FACE regulates activity that has 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce is supported by 
Supreme Court cases young and old. Recently, in Jones v. 
United States, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (2000), 
the Supreme Court considered whether the arson of an 
owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial 
purposes qualified as arson of property used in interstate 
commerce within the meaning of the federal arson statute. 
The Court held that arson of a private dwelling was beyond 
the reach of federal commerce power to criminalize arson. 
See id. at 1911. To determine, however, whether the arson 
of a particular facility is a commerce-affecting act, the 
Court instructed that "[t]he proper inquiry .. . is into the 
function of the building itself, and then a determination of 
whether that function affects interstate commerce." Id. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We respectfully register our disagreement with the dissent. The 
dissent characterizes the connection between clinic blockades and 
interstate commerce as the same attenuated "but-for-causal chain" 
between gender-motivated crimes and interstate commerce rejected by 
the Court in Morrison. This view narrowly focuses on the activity 
regulated by FACE in the abstract and fails to acknowledge the national 
market for reproductive health services in this country. Congress 
determined that the abortion provider shortage in the United States has 
resulted in a national market for abortion services. In this context, 
abortion-related violence committed to close down a reproductive health 
clinic or deter a woman from accessing its services has a direct effect on 
interstate commerce. Abortion-related violence in the specific context of 
a national market for reproductive services simply cannot be compared 
to gender-motivated crime -- the activity regulated by VAWA. Given the 
national market for abortion services, the nexus between the activity 
regulated by FACE and interstate commerce is direct. 
 
The dissent also relies on a comparison of anti-abortion violence to 
rape, robbery, and trespass to conclude that anti-abortion violence is a 
local problem properly regulated by the anti-abortion movement. This 
comparison fails to acknowledge the motivation of the anti-abortion 
movement. Although the individual tactics of anti-abortion activists may 
have similar characteristics as common law crimes, the comparison ends 
there. As Congress found, the anti-abortion movement targets 
specifically a branch of commerce that operates in a national market. 
Hence, anti-abortion violence is a national, rather than a local, problem. 
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1910. Here, the facilities blockaded and temporarily or 
permanently closed by the activities of anti-abortion 
protestors are businesses that provide reproductive health 
services and are directly involved in interstate commerce. 
Thus, under the functionality test provided in Jones, the 
blockading and destruction of reproductive health clinics, 
just like the arson of a commercial building, is a commerce- 
affecting activity and therefore properly regulated by 
Congress. 
 
In Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250-58 
(1964), the Supreme Court upheld Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 as a proper regulation of an activity that affects 
commerce. The holding was premised on the conclusion 
that discrimination in restaurants results in serving fewer 
customers, therefore adversely affecting interstate 
commerce. Here, given Congress's specific findings that 
there exists a national market for reproductive health 
services suffering from a shortage in services, the effect of 
temporarily and permanently shutting down reproductive 
health clinics that are often frequented and staffed by 
people crossing state lines has a direct effect on interstate 
commerce under the reasoning presented in Atlanta Motel. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the activity regulated by FACE 
is economic in nature. We further determine that due to the 
national nature of reproductive health services and anti- 
abortion protests, the civil penalty provision is within the 
boundaries of Congress's power to regulate interstate 
commerce. Applying the deference that is due Congress's 
findings, see Parker, 108 F.3d at 30-31, we further 
conclude that, unlike the statutes reviewed in Lopez and 
Morrison, FACE regulates conduct that Congress had a 
rational basis to conclude has a direct and substantial 
effect on interstate commerce. We hold, therefore, that 
FACE falls within the scope of congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause as a legitimate regulation of 
activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
 
B. First Amendment. 
 
Finally, we join the decisions of the courts of appeals that 
FACE does not regulate speech and expression protected by 
the First Amendment. See Hart, 212 F.3d at 1071-73; 
 
                                24 
  
United States v. Balint, 201 F.3d 928, 934-36 (7th Cir. 
2000); Weslin, 156 F.3d at 296-98; United States v. Wilson, 
154 F.3d 658, 662-64 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1081 (1999); Hoffman, 126 F.3d at 588-89; Bird, 124 
F.3d at 683-84; Terry, 101 F.3d at 1418-22; Soderna, 82 
F.3d at 1374-77; Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 921-24; Cheffer, 55 
F.3d at 1521-22. These courts have thoroughly addressed 
the arguments presented by Defendants in this case and we 
are in full agreement with their decisions. For this reason, 
we do not expound on our analysis of these claims. 
 
Defendants first argue that FACE is a view-point based 
restriction on speech and expressive conduct that is 
protected under the First Amendment. FACE is not view- 
point based. The language of the statute and the legislative 
history demonstrates that FACE governs all individuals and 
groups that obstruct the provision of reproductive health 
services and religious worship. The purpose of FACE was to 
protect clinics, their staff, and patients from the harm 
suffered when their right to provide and receive 
reproductive health services was interfered with. The law 
applies equally to all who interfere with the provision of 
these services, regardless of the motivation for the conduct. 
See Weslin, 156 F.3d at 296-97; Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923; 
see also Pro-Choice Network of Western New York v. 
Schenck, 67 F.3d 377, 386 (2d Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff 'd 
in part, 519 U.S. 357 (1996) (holding that because the 
purpose of an injunction enjoining a group of anti-abortion 
protestors was to prevent the harm that prospective 
patients would suffer if the anti-abortionists' activities 
continued, the injunction was content neutral). Thus, 
Congress did not pass FACE because of disagreement with 
the message of anti-abortionists. Accord Hill v. Colorado, 
120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000) (holding Colorado law that makes it 
unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care 
facility's entrance to knowingly approach within eight feet of 
another person without that person's consent is a content- 
neutral restriction). Because FACE prohibits conduct 
regardless of the view-point of the actor, FACE does not 
discriminate on the basis of content. 
 
Furthermore, FACE, which is view-point neutral, governs 
conduct not speech. See Terry, 101 F.3d at 1418-19; 
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5. Defendants also argue that because the Attorney General described 
the actions of lawful protesters in its appellate brief, FACE, as applied 
in 
this case, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. This argument is 
without merit. 
Hoffman, 126 F.3d at 588; Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521. By its 
very terms, FACE regulates "force," "threat[s] of force," or 
"physical obstruction." 18 U.S.C. S 248(a). Activities that 
injure, threaten, or obstruct are not protected by the First 
Amendment, whether or not such conduct communicates a 
message. See Wilson, 154 F.3d at 663; Terry, 101 F.3d at 
1418-19. Although the conduct may have "expressive 
components," this does not exempt it from governmental 
prohibition. Weslin, 156 F.3d at 297. We hold that FACE is 
a valid restriction of conduct that has an expressive 
component under the three-part test in United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-82 (1968). FACE serves the 
important governmental interest in ensuring public safety 
and a woman's right to seek reproductive health services; 
this interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech; 
and FACE is narrowly tailored to meet these ends. See 
Weslin, 156 F.3d at 297-98; Terry, 101 F.3d at 1419-20. 
FACE is therefore constitutional under O'Brien . 
Accordingly, we hold that FACE is constitutional under the 
First Amendment.5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
       Therefore, we conclude that compensatory statutory 
damages under FACE are properly awarded per violation 
and jointly and severally among defendants who 
participated in the violation. Furthermore, we join our 
sister circuits and hold that FACE is a constitutional 
exercise of Congress's commerce power and does not violate 
the First Amendment. The District Court is affirmed. 
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WEIS, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
 
Were I to reach the damages issue in this case, I would 
agree with the majority's conclusion that defendants are 
liable on a joint and several basis per incident, and not per 
individual. Obviously, if the government had sought actual 
damages, it would have been restricted to recovering an 
amount proven at trial, and that sum could be recovered 
only once. The fact that Congress provided for statutory 
damages as an alternative to establishing the actual loss 
does not change the nature of the compensation, nor make 
it cumulative. 
 
However, I differ with the majority in its conclusion that 
FACE survives constitutional scrutiny. I am aware that 
seven Courts of Appeals have upheld the constitutionality 
of the Act. Some of these decisions were made over dissents 
arguing that FACE could not be sustained under the 
analysis in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
Although the Courts of Appeals opinions considered Lopez, 
they essentially treated it as a narrow holding that did not 
affect measures such as FACE. 
 
Doubts that Lopez had application beyond its unique 
factual setting, however, were dissipated by the expansive 
holding in United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 
(2000). There, the Court revisited the question of Congress' 
power under the Commerce Clause to legislate on matters 
traditionally within the province of the States. Setting aside 
portions of the Violence Against Women Act, the Court 
wrote that "[w]e accordingly reject the argument that 
Congress may regulate non-economic, violent criminal 
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly 
local." Id. at 1754. Continuing, the Court said, "we can 
think of no better example of the police power, which the 
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in 
the States, than the suppression of violent crime and 
vindication of its victims." Id. 
 
Together, Lopez and Morrison mandate limits to the 
federalization of local crime under the aegis of the 
Commerce Clause. FACE, like the Gun-Free School Zones 
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Act and the Violence Against Women Act, is an example of 
congressional intrusion into criminal law traditionally 
within the province of the States. These statutes are similar 
in that "neither the actors nor their conduct has a 
commercial character, and neither the purposes nor the 
design of the statute[s] has an evident commercial nexus." 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 
Considered alone, these statements clearly raise the 
likelihood that FACE is unconstitutional. Upon more 
detailed review, it becomes clear that Morrison  permits no 
other conclusion. 
 
As the majority here observes, the Supreme Court has 
identified three categories of activities that Congress may 
regulate under the Commerce power: first, the use of 
channels of interstate commerce; second, the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may 
come only from intrastate activity; and third, activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce. Morrison, 120 S. 
Ct. at 1749. No contention has been made that thefirst 
category is involved here, and the Courts of Appeals that 
have considered the constitutionality of FACE have 
generally upheld the Act under the third category. For this 
reason, I will begin with a discussion of that point. 
 
I. Regulation of Activities 
 
Having a Substantial Relation To Interstate Commerce  
 
In determining whether Congress may properly regulate 
an activity under the third Commerce Clause classification, 
Lopez and Morrison present considerations that can be 
distilled into the following four questions: 
 
       1) Is the activity of an apparent commercial character; 
 
       2) Does the statute contain an express jurisdictional 
       element that may establish a connection with interstate 
       commerce; 
 
       3) Are there congressional findings that illuminate a 
       reasonable legislative judgment that the activity 
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       substantially affects interstate commerce, although 
       such an effect is not "visible to the naked eye"; and 
 
       4) Is there a link between the activity and a substantial 
       effect on interstate commerce that is not so attenuated 
       that the federal-state balance is destroyed? 
 
See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1749-52 & n.4; Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 559-68. These considerations will be examined in turn. 
 
A. The Activity is Not Commercial 
 
FACE is drafted to prohibit specific conduct outside 
reproductive health clinics. It provides in relevant part: 
 
       (a) Prohibited activities. -- Whoever -- 
 
       (1) by force or threat of force or by physical 
       obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or 
       interferes with or attempts to injure, intimate or 
       interfere with any person because that person is or 
       has been, or in order to intimidate such person or 
       any other person or any class of persons from, 
       obtaining or providing reproductive health services; 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of 
       a facility, or attempts to do so, because such facility 
       provides reproductive health services . . . 
 
       shall be subject to the penalties provided in subsection 
       (b) and the civil remedies provided in subsection (c) 
       . . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. S 248. 
 
The services provided by abortion clinics are clearly 
commercial in nature, conducted as they are in exchange 
for money. But these services are not the activities targeted 
by the legislation. FACE prohibits third parties from 
interfering with patients and staff entering abortion clinics, 
as well as from inflicting damage to the property itself. By 
its plain language, the statute is directed against the 
conduct of those external to a clinic's operations. 
 
As the proscribed activity, a protestor's conduct does not 
involve a purchase, sale, or any exchange of value in return 
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for the rendering of a service, and cannot in any sense be 
deemed economic or commercial in character. Although 
blockades may reduce a clinic's revenue, the prohibited 
conduct is fundamentally criminal in nature and does not 
fit easily within the category of commercial activity. 
 
The fact that criminal conduct may also have financial 
effects does not transform that activity into one commercial 
in nature. Murder and robbery have monetary 
consequences, but that does not transform criminal codes 
into commercial regulation. Morrison made it clear that the 
nature of the activity to be restricted is determined by an 
examination of the conduct itself, and not by such external 
factors as financial effects, which are one step removed 
from the statute's focus. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1750. 
 
In both Lopez and Morrison, thefinancial effects of the 
prohibited conduct were not disputed. Justice Breyer 
outlined in his Lopez dissent the "obvious" links between 
the economy and gun violence. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 619-22 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter's dissent in Morrison 
cited a Senate report from the legislative history that 
estimated the impact of violent crimes against women to be, 
at minimum, $3 billion annually. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 
1762 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court nonetheless 
concluded in Lopez that the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
was "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do 
with `commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise," Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 561, and said in Morrison that"[g]ender- 
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751. 
 
It is apparent that the Court examined the prohibited 
conduct without reference to its economic effects. Courts 
reviewing FACE should employ a similarly disciplined 
analysis. 
 
When considering the limits of congressional power, the 
Court has adopted a "practical conception of commercial 
regulation." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); see also Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1750 (quoting 
Lopez). But to sustain FACE, courts must reject that 
concept. The statute does not resemble a commercial 
regulation, but instead a typical exercise of a state's police 
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power: prohibiting trespass, intimidation, and violence; and 
providing criminal sanctions as well as injunctions. 
 
The threshold inquiry articulated in Lopez and repeated 
in Morrison is consistent with the Court's prior Commerce 
Clause decisions. As the Court wrote, "thus far in our 
Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause 
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is 
economic in nature." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751. Two 
cases cited by the Court in that context provide a useful 
contrast to the present dispute. 
 
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States , 379 U.S. 
241, 261-62 (1964), and the parallel case of Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964), the Court upheld 
legislation requiring hotels and restaurants to make 
accommodations open to black patrons as well as white. 
The regulated enterprises were clearly within Morrison's 
definition of economic activity. It was the hoteliers and 
restauranteurs themselves, in the operation of their 
business, who had to alter their conduct in order to comply 
with the law. The legislation did not apply to third parties 
whose conduct may or may not have been commercial. 
 
FACE does not in any way control the operation of a 
clinic in its procedures or selection of patients. That 
distinction, as well as the lack of a jurisdictional element, 
separates FACE from the Civil Rights legislation upheld in 
Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach. 
 
To cavalierly dismiss the traditional distinctions between 
criminal and commercial conduct is to "downplay the role 
that the economic nature of the regulated activity plays in 
our Commerce Clause analysis." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 
1750. Both Lopez and Morrison made the inquiry into 
commercial character a key element to their holdings. In 
the present case, the only reasoned answer to the question 
of whether the blockading is commercial in character must 
be in the negative. 
 
B. The Act Contains No Jurisdictional "Hook" 
 
A jurisdictional element in a statute serves to define the 
limits of the regulated activity. Including such a 
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requirement assures that the legislation is directed toward 
a defined scope of conduct, one more apt to be within the 
reach of the commerce power granted to Congress. See 
United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 594 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(Becker, Ch.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
A statutorily required proof of connection with interstate 
commerce mandates a case-by-case inquiry. 
 
Stressing the redemptive power of such an element, the 
Court in Lopez discussed United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 
336 (1971), where it circumspectly read federal gun 
legislation to require a nexus with interstate commerce. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. In Bass, the Court chose to avoid 
a potential constitutional infirmity in this fashion because 
" `unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be 
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state 
balance.' " Id. (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 349). Similarly, 
Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 1908, 1910 (2000), 
carefully interpreted an arson statute so as not to apply to 
all private residences and thus avoided the constitutional 
issues, despite interstate connections in the forms of a 
mortgage, an insurance policy and the use of natural gas. 
 
But in FACE, there is no such ambiguity. Indeed, it 
appears that Congress simply sought to extend a"remedy 
over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent 
crime." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. Without a 
jurisdictional clause to provide a case-by-case limitation, 
the Act's reach becomes vulnerable to a Constitutional 
challenge. 
 
Because FACE lacks the jurisdictional element, the 
government in this case was not required to establish any 
connection with interstate commerce. It was not necessary 
to show that interstate travel was hindered or affected, that 
equipment or furnishings were purchased in interstate 
commerce, or that any of the other jurisdictional indicia 
that have been used in statutes that have passed 
constitutional muster were satisfied. All that the 
government had to show was that a clinic, even if a purely 
local enterprise, was being blockaded. The prosecutor thus 
had almost unlimited discretion to intervene in a purely 
local disturbance. 
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The preservation of the constitutional allocation of power 
between state and federal governments is a serious concern 
for both the legislative and judicial branches. Including a 
jurisdictional requirement in a statute is one way Congress 
can demonstrate that it recognizes this important issue and 
has acted in light of that knowledge. 
 
The absence of a jurisdictional clause in FACE is a fatal 
flaw, one that is not cured by the congressionalfindings 
that will be discussed next. 
 
C. The Legislative Findings Are Inadequate  
 
Unlike Lopez, but like Morrison, FACE's legislative history 
contains congressional findings. As a result of hearings, 
Congress alleged in Committee reports and in floor debates 
that patients and doctors travel interstate for abortions; 
that local authorities were sometimes unable to control 
violence at abortion clinics; and that obstructionist tactics 
had caused losses in the millions of dollars, caused clinics 
to close, and had intimidated physicians as well as 
patients. Based on anecdotal evidence, Congress decided 
that federal intervention authorized by the Commerce 
Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
appropriate. 
 
On several occasions, we have said that congressional 
findings are entitled to judicial deference and that it is not 
our role to " `second-guess the legislative judgment of 
Congress.' " United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 30 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (quoting Bishop, 66 F.3d at 577). Accordingly, all 
that was required of a reviewing court was to ensure that 
Congress had a rational basis for its legislation. Id. 
 
However correct that approach may be in other settings, 
it can no longer be said that such substantial deference is 
due in cases assessing the limits of congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause. In Morrison, the Court stated 
that "the existence of congressional findings is not 
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of 
Commerce Clause legislation." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. 
Whether the effect upon interstate commerce is substantial 
enough to make Congress' exercise of power under the 
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Commerce Clause appropriate "is ultimately a judicial 
rather than a legislative question." Id. 
 
As the basis for concluding that blockades have a 
substantial effect upon interstate commerce, Congress 
reasoned that obstructions that deter patients from going to 
a clinic caused diminished business for the enterprise. In 
some cases, when clinics closed, women were required to 
travel, perhaps interstate, to obtain the services of another 
establishment. 
 
This is the very same "but-for causal chain" of logic that 
the Court explicitly rejected in Morrison. Id. at 1752-53. If 
every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce stemming 
from an occurrence of violent crime satisfied the 
substantial effects test, then Congress could "regulate any 
crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that 
crime has substantial effects on employment, production, 
transit, or consumption." Id. 
 
The opinions of the Courts of Appeals that have upheld 
FACE all rely heavily on the legislative history for 
concluding that a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
existed. See United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292, 296 (2d 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 666, 678 (5th 
Cir. 1997); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415-16 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 920-21 
(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 681 
(7th Cir. 1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 
(11th Cir. 1995); American Life League v. Reno , 47 F.3d 
642, 647 (4th Cir. 1994). But these decisions are undercut 
by Morrison. With the asserted justifications 
constitutionally infirm, the legislative history does little to 
demonstrate a reasonable congressional judgment that the 
prohibited activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce. 
 
D. Any Link is Too Attenuated 
 
As was said in Lopez, "[i]n a sense any conduct in this 
interdependent world of ours has an ultimate commercial 
origin or consequence, but we have not yet said the 
commerce power may reach so far. If Congress attempts 
that extension, then at the least we must inquire whether 
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the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an 
area of traditional state concern." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Any supposed link between the 
proscribed conduct in FACE and interstate commerce, if 
one exists, would be so attenuated that it could be used to 
also justify a general federal police power. 
 
Even assuming that some of the surgical instruments, 
medications, furnishings and equipment were in interstate 
commerce at some point, such a connection is so nebulous 
that it provides no useful boundary under the Commerce 
Clause. According to Morrison, allowing such remote factors 
to govern constitutional limitations would allow Congress to 
"completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between 
national and local authority." Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. 
 
Persons seeking to block access to abortion clinics may 
be a national problem, but in that sense, rape, robbery and 
trespass present national concerns as well. Being a mere 
commonality of the several States does not justify federal 
regulation of these matters under the auspices of interstate 
commerce. 
 
The conduct at issue here -- blocking access to a 
building and verbally intimidating those who attempted to 
enter -- is a quintessentially local problem. Despite that 
obvious and inescapable fact, the federal government chose 
to use its resources where they were neither required nor 
appropriate. 
 
Because the prohibited activity has no commercial 
character and no jurisdictional element need be proved, the 
statute as drafted impermissibly extends federal jurisdiction 
over conduct that is purely and simply intrastate and has 
no relationship in any substantial manner to interstate 
commerce. Without a jurisdictional prerequisite, FACE 
leaves the federal government free to intrude into a state's 
sovereign duty to maintain order in any abortion clinic- 
related disturbance, no matter how trivial. 
 
Contrary to the congressional findings, here there was no 
abdication of responsibility by state authorities. A state 
court had issued an injunction against obstructing entry to 
the clinic. On each of the three occasions when the conduct 
occurred, the local police intervened, arrested protesters, 
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and filed state criminal charges. All of the blockades were 
controlled by local authorities, including the last one, which 
caused the local police to seek assistance from neighboring 
municipalities. The only reported injuries were the result of 
one demonstrator kicking and head-butting a police officer. 
 
From the standpoint of local law enforcement personnel, 
the conduct that FACE addresses is not extraordinary, but 
is akin to disturbances following a high school game 
between bitter rivals, where fans demonstrate their loyalty 
in mass unruly gatherings. Celebrations by fans of Super 
Bowl champions frequently require intervention by city 
police to maintain order and protect property (some of it 
undoubtedly in interstate commerce). Near riots at rock 
concerts by performers who have traveled interstate are 
routinely controlled by local police forces. Many of the same 
arguments used to justify FACE could be used to federalize 
criminal conduct of this nature, despite the competence 
state authorities have demonstrated over the years. 1 
 
It is difficult to understand why the federal government 
invoked FACE when local authorities had the situation well 
in hand. Duplication of state and federal injunctions wastes 
judicial resources and leads to uncertainty and confusion. 
Moreover, overlapping of enforcement authority is 
detrimental to the federal system and the liberties it 
secures. "[C]itizens must have some means of knowing 
which of the two governments to hold accountable for the 
failure to perform a given function. `Federalism serves to 
assign political responsibility, not to obscure it.' " Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting FTC 
v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992)). When 
overlapping occurs, the lines drawn by federalism are 
blurred and the "resultant inability to hold either branch of 
the government answerable to the citizens is more 
dangerous even than devolving too much authority to the 
remote central power." Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Where state officials are unable to adequately control disturbances 
with their own resources, 42 U.S.C. S 10501 allows officials to petition 
the Attorney General for assistance from the federal law enforcement 
community. 
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FACE is a glaring example of the federalization of local 
criminal law that is fatally flawed in its implementation 
because it regulates activities with no commercial 
character. The statute contains no jurisdictional element 
which might cabin its operation within the confines of the 
Commerce Clause, and the congressional findings fail to 
provide the necessary justification for federal intrusion into 
local law enforcement. 
 
II. Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce  
 
The government also argues that FACE may be sustained 
under the second category noted by the Supreme Court-- 
protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
or persons or things in interstate commerce. The Court of 
Appeals in United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 674 (5th 
Cir. 1997) concluded that FACE was not sustainable under 
this second category because no evidence was submitted at 
trial to support such a conclusion. The Court in Terry v. 
Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996) simply noted 
that only the third category was relevant to the case before 
it. 
 
The Court of Appeals in United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 
F.3d 913, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1996), considered this second 
category, observing that the clinic in that case was located 
in a metropolitan area straddling two states. Because of 
this, a number of patients and staff members did not live 
in Missouri where the clinic was located, and therefore, 
traveled interstate to reach it. Id. On that basis, the court 
concluded that the statute protected people and business 
in interstate commerce and so was within Congress' power 
to enact under the second category. Id. 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It is interesting, but not determinative, that in Dinwiddie, the record 
established the interstate travel of a doctor and some patients. No such 
findings were made in the case before us. In any event, the Dinwiddie 
evidence would not cure the facial deficiency in the text of the Act 
itself. 
As a criminal statute, it must give notice of the nature of the conduct 
proscribed, United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954), including 
jurisdictional facts that must be proved. The fact that the prosecution 
produces evidence that could satisfy a hypothetical jurisdictional 
element cannot cure the lack of the material element in the statute 
itself. 
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Dinwiddie, however, failed to consider the significance of 
the lack of a jurisdictional hook in FACE, although such 
absence was a factor in Lopez. It is noteworthy that the two 
cases cited by the Dinwiddie court to support its holding 
that the clinic was "in interstate commerce" were based on 
statutes that did contain jurisdictional limitations. E.g., 
United States v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 
271, 275-76 (1975) (Clayton Act); United States v. 
Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 670 (1995) (RICO). 
 
I am not persuaded that a purely local commercial 
service that is frequented by nearby but out-of-state 
patrons is within the scope of the Commerce Clause 
without the saving grace of a jurisdictional clause. See 
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1752 n.5. 
 
It is significant that in Lopez, the cases cited in support 
of the commerce power under the second category involved 
such matters as the Safety Appliance Act as applied to 
railroad cars used in intrastate and interstate commerce, 
Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 24 (1911), 
and fixing intrastate railroad fees that affect interstate 
rates. Shreveport Rates Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 345 (1914). 
Other examples cited by the Supreme Court include 
destruction of an aircraft or thefts from interstate 
shipments. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 
(1971). None of these situations approaches the broad 
sweep of FACE, which, it must be said again, lacks any 
jurisdictional limitation to restrict its application to those 
matters demonstrably in interstate commerce. 
 
III. Fourteenth Amendment 
 
The government also attempts to sustain the statute as a 
valid exercise of congressional power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Morrison provides a short answer to that 
contention. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to the 
states, and like the Violence Against Women Act, FACE is 
directed at private conduct where there is no indication of 
state action. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1756. FACE, therefore, 
cannot be sustained under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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I conclude that FACE is unconstitutional under both the 
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
judgments in this case should be set aside. 
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